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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellee's

Statement

of

Facts

contains

errors

and

misstates the evidence that was presented to the Court.
Dr. Stewart's evaluation and subsequent recommendation was
done 8-9 months before the Trial and was not updated and the
Court did not adequately consider the stability of the minor
child during said period of time and the child's relationship
with her sister, Brandi.
The visitation awarded to the plaintiff by the Court was
restrictive and was not as liberal as the visitation that was
allowed to the defendant during the pendency of the action and,
further, was not based upon the evidence before the Court.

Said

restrictive award of visitation was clearly inequitable to the
plaintiff and manifested an abuse of discretion.
The

Court

misinterpreted

the

evidence

represented

in

regards to the evaluation costs of Dr. Stewart and it was clearly
inequitable

to order

the plaintiff

to pay

$1,500.00

to the

defendant for Dr. Stewart and manifested an abuse of discretion.
ARGUMENT
I
APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OP PACTS CONTAINED ERRORS
AND MISSTATES THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED
In

paragraph

2

of

Appellee's

Statement

of

Pacts

insinuates that he did not know the child was born until four

1
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he

days

after

the birth.

However, the defendant, in his own

admission, indicated that he was told about the birth of the
child the day after the child's birth.
In

paragraph

5

of

Appellee's

(Vol. II, T. 158-159)
Statement

of

Facts

he

indicates that Dr. Stewart talked with Paige's day care provider
which is inaccurate.

Dr. Stewart only talked to the day care

provider for the half-sister, Brandi, at the time Dr. Stewart did
her evaluation since the minor child, Paige, was not in day care
at that time.
In paragraph 8 of Appellee's Statement of Facts is an
over-generalization since the witnesses that testified did not
substantiate

the

observations

made

by Dr. Stewart

and

said

statement of facts does not refer to any specific transcript
citations.
In paragraph 9 of Appellee's Statement of Facts, Appellee
refers to conflicting evidence; however, the citations made do
not indicate conflicting evidence as to plaintiff's testimony
regarding the checks that she presented to her mother for day
care costs.
II
DR. STEWART'S RECOMMENDATION WAS NOT UPDATED
AND THE COURT DID NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDER THE FACTORS
OF STABILITY FOR THE MINOR CHILD AND THE RELATIONSHIP
WITH HER SISTERf BRANDI
First of all, in Appellee's Argument relating to the Court
giving greater weight to Dr. Stewart's evaluation than Dr. Swaner
2
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or Dr. McManemin's testimony, the Appellee stated at page 11 of
his Brief that Dr. Stewart interviewed Paige's day care provider
and performed an MMPI and Rotter sentence completion test on
Paige.

Both representations are in error.

Stewart

did

her

evaluation, Paige

did

At the time Dr.

not have a day care

provider since she was only 10 months old and, further, there
were no tests performed on Paige due to her age.
Again, the Court seemed to ignore the evidence presented
by Dr. Swaner and Dr. McManemin in regards to the relationship of
the minor child with her sister, Brandi, as well as the stability
of the environment that the minor child was in.

Specifically,

the Court did not consider the fact that Dr. Stewart's evaluation
was done 8-9 months before the Trial and that Dr. McManemin's and
the day care provider, Myra Brodale's observations of the minor
child during the 8-9 months prior to the Trial specifically
indicated

that

emotionally
present

the

minor

well-adjusted

circumstances

rewarding to Paige.
Stability

of

child
child

were

was

and

extremely

a

happy,

healthy

and

that her environment and
stable

and

emotionally

(Vol. II, T.24-29, Vol. II, T.58-59)
the

present

custodial

arrangements

and

circumstances for the minor child is a dominant factor as not
only mentioned

in the various cases dealing with custody of

children but also in factors to be considered by an evaluator
pursuant

to

Rule

4-903

of

the

Utah

Code
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of

Judicial

Administration.

Specifically, that factor indicated that the

evaluator must determine the general interest in continuing the
previously determined custodial arrangements where the child is
happy and well-adjusted.

Not only was the child happy and

well-adjusted during the first 18 months of her life wherein the
plaintiff had custody but the only evidence presented to the
Court regarding the same was that of both Dr. Swaner who found
that both Paige and her sister were doing extremely well and
there was no reason to disturb the present custody arrangement
and

the

stability

of

the

circumstances.

Dr. Stewart

only

indicated that the child was young enough to make a change but
did not present very much evidence in regards to the trauma that
would occur with the minor child by changing the custody.

More

specifically, Dr. Stewart did not do an update in regards to her
evaluation and could present no evidence whatsoever to the Court
in regards to what occurred during the eight months prior to the
Trial when the bonding between Paige and her sister, Brandi,
increased

dramatically

and

the

stability

of

the

custodial

arrangement with the plaintiff became more and more apparent. Dr.
McManemin, who observed the minor child Paige a few weeks before
the Trial/ indicated that there was a very close relationship
between Paige and Brandi and that, again, it would not be in
Paige's best interest to upset that relationship or the stability
which Paige had being in the custody of her mother.
T.59)
4
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(Vol. Ill,

Since the Court did not adequately consider those factors
and Dr. Stewart did not consider the factors during the previous
eight months prior to the Trial the Court abused its discretion
in not considering the evidence of Dr. Swaner and Dr. McManemin
and Myra Brodale, the day care provider, regards to the stability
of the minor child, Paige, and her relationship with her sister,
Brandi, during the immediate eight months prior to the Trial.
The Court seemed to ignore the only evidence that was
presented to it in regards to the trauma that would occur with
the minor child due to her separation from her primary caretaker,
the plaintiff.

Specifically, Dr. McManemin's testimony (Vol.

Ill, T.55-63) indicated that at the age of the minor child, Paige,
that she not be separated from her mother who was the primary
caretaker and that it would be traumatic.
to be traumatic for Paige.
to the bonding

with

In fact, it has proven

Further, Dr. McManemin testified as

the minor child, Brandi, that had been

observed just prior to the Trial and not 8 or 9 months prior
thereto when Dr. Stewart did her evaluation.

The evidence was

that both Brandi and Paige were happy, well-adjusted children and
very closely bonded and, further, that Paige did not want to be
with

her
The

Court

definitely

abused

father.
its

discretion

in

not

considering the evidence of Dr. McManemin in regards to the minor
child at the time of the Trial and should not have given so much

5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

credibility to observations made by Dr. Stewart 8 or 9 months
prior thereto.
Ill
THE VISITATION AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF WAS
RESTRICTIVE AND NOT BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE BEFORE
THE COURT
Appellee, on page 16 of his Brief, makes a statement that
the visitation schedule is no more restrictive than the then
existing District Court Standard Visitation Schedule and refers
to Volume I, T. 152. However, there is nothing in the transcript
which would support said statement since the only reference to
the same is in a question asked by an attorney and

is not

evidence that was presented to the Court by any of the witnesses.
The fact remains that the visitation awarded by the Court was
restrictive and did not give the plaintiff overnight visitation.
The

Court's

school-age

standard

children

and

visitation
there

was

regards to children under that age.

schedule
no

only

suggested

deals

with

schedule

in

Further, Appellee, on page

17 of his Brief, states that there was testimony that overnight
visitation could be detrimental to Paige.
citation

to

inaccurate.

the

transcript

and

said

Again, there is no

statement

is

totally

There was no evidence presented to the Court that

overnight visitation with Paige's mother, plaintiff, would be
detrimental

to Paige.

In

fact, the evidence was

that the

plaintiff had custody of Paige during the first 18 months of her
life and the transcript is void of any evidence presented to the
Court that continuing any overnight visitation with the plaintiff
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fi

would

have any detrimental

child, Paige.

effect whatsoever

upon

the minor

The evidence supported to the contrary since both

Dr. McManemin, Dr. Swaner and Myra Brodale testified that the
relationship between the plaintiff and the minor child, Paige,
was healthy and that said minor child was happy, well-adjusted
and doing fine.

Again, the testimony of Dr. Swaner was that the

defendant,

Evans,

Mr.

should

not

have

because he was not the primary caretaker.

overnight

visitation

Dr. Swaner was never

asked about overnight visitation with the plaintiff and, in fact,
there was not any evidence presented to the Court whatsoever in
regards

to the plaintiff

being awarded overnight visitation.

Further, as was stated in Appellant's initial Brief the findings
of the Court are totally void of any finding in regards to why
the plaintiff's visitation was restricted so that she could not
have

any

overnight

liberal

visitation,

totally

inequitable

visitation.

Denying

specifically
under

the

the plaintiff

overnight

circumstance

visitation,
of

the

said
was

evidence

presented to the Court and manifested a clear abuse of discretion
and a bias of the trial court against the plaintiff, and was not
in the best interest of the minor child.
IV
THE COURT MISINTERPRETED THE EVIDENCE IN ORDERING THE
PLAINTIFF TO PAY $1,500.00 TO DR. STEWART
First of all, there was no evidence presented to the Court
7
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that Dr. Stewart's fee was, in fact, $3,000.00.

The truth is

<

that Dr. Stewart's fee was $2,500.00 and then after the Trial she
charged an additional $500.00 for her appearance in Court.

It

seems not only inequitable but an abuse of discretion to order

<

the plaintiff to pay for Dr. Stewart's Court appearance when the
Court had to pay for the Court appearances of her two expert
witnesses, Dr. Swaner and Dr. McManemin, especially when the
defendant's income far exceeded the plaintiff's.

<

Plaintiff did

suffer inequities and she not only lost custody of the minor
child but lost income of child support of $195.00 per month and
had to start paying child support of $153.00 per month.

<

She also

had to pay all of her own attorney's fees and then was stuck with
an additional $1,500.00 payment to the defendant for Dr. Stewart
when, in fact, the defendant's income was almost $1,000.00 a
month more than the plaintiff's.

Further, the Court makes no

specific finding as to why the Court felt that the plaintiff
should pay one-half of not only Dr. Stewart's fee but one-half of
her fee for appearing at the Trial.
V
THE COURT IGNORED THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY
THE PLAINTIFF AS TO THE DAY CARE COSTS
At the Trial the plaintiff presented to the Court Exhibit
"3 n

(Vol. I, T. 41-42), a copy of which is attached hereto as

Exhibit

"A".

Said Exhibit

"3" specifically was not only a
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(

summary of the day care costs incurred but the actual check
numbers and copies of the checks indicating the total amount that
the plaintiff paid for day care costs.
The

only

conflicting

evidence

as

suggested

by

the

Appellee in his Reply Brief was that of plaintiff's half-sister
who indicated that the money paid to plaintiff's mother was to
pay for food.

This was not conflicting evidence and did not

contradict the evidence presented by the plaintiff that she had,
in fact, paid her mother the $100.00 per month for the day care
of the minor child, Paige.

The Trial Court clearly committed

error in not awarding to plaintiff one-half her day care costs
since

the

Court

ordered

the

plaintiff

to pay

to defendant

one-half of any day care costs incurred after the change of
custody.

The mere fact that plaintiff's mother testified that

she told a lending institution that she was not charging the
plaintiff day care is not sufficient evidence to indicate that,
in fact, the plaintiff had not paid her mother for the day care
since the evidence clearly indicated that she has as evidenced by
the checks and the notations thereon that they were for day care.
Plaintiff should have been awarded judgment against the defendant
for one-half of her day care costs.
CONCLUSION
The Court's award of custody to defendant was an abuse of
discretion and should be reversed and custody awarded to the
plaintiff, the primary caretaker of the minor child.

9
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The visitation awarded to the plaintiff was restrictive in
nature and showed a definite lack of concern by the Trial Court
as to the effect on the minor child since the plaintiff had been
the primary caretaker during the first 18 months of said minor
child's life and there was no evidence presented which would
support the Court's decision to restrict overnight visitation
with the plaintiff.
Both the Court's Order denying plaintiff her day care
expenses

and

evaluation

ordering

were

her

to pay one-half

unsupported

by

the

of Dr. Stewart's

evidence

and

abuse

of

discrfetion and should be reversed with a redetermination in
regards to the same.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of November, 1993.

RICHARD S. NEMELKA
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OP NAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of Appellant's Reply
Brief to Randy S. Ludlow, Attorney for Appellee, 311 South State
Street, Suite 280, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 15th day of
November, 1993, postage prepaid.
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